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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of various economic factors in determining the relationship 
between functional income distribution and economic growth. Inspired by the seminal paper 
of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), we base our analysis on a demand-driven distribution and 
growth model for an open economy that allows for either profit-led or wage-led growth. To 
this end, we use a cross-country panel dataset consisting of 41 countries from 1961 to 2011. 
In the first step of the empirical analysis, we first estimate whether growth regime is wage-led 
or profit-led in each country. Next, in the second step, using probit and meta-regression 
approaches with cross-country data, we analyse the effects of various macroeconomic 
variables on the nature of economic growth. Our results strongly reflect that a higher level of 
trade openness is associated with a lower probability of being wage-led. Moreover, we find 
evidence that lower wage inequality would make an economy more wage-led and that 
countries with a greater private credit-to-GDP ratio are more likely to be profit-led. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to investigate the structural factors that would determine the relationship between 
economic growth and income inequality. For our analysis, we follow a neo-Kaleckian framework 
depicted by Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) in which economic growth is demand-driven. In this 
framework, the overall impact of changes in wage share on growth determines whether the regime is 
profit-led or wage-led. The rising wage share can stimulate economic growth because workers have a 
larger marginal propensity to consume compared to capitalists (e.g., Keynes, 1936; Hein and Vogel, 
2007; Onaran and Galanis, 2014). However, higher wage shares can also create disincentives for 
private investment as it also means squeezing the profit share. Moreover, higher wage shares driven by 
higher wages can reduce the international competitiveness of domestic firms. Whichever effect is 
larger is an empirical question that is widely investigated in the literature (e.g., Naastepad, 2006; 
Onaran, Stockhammer and Grafl, 2011; Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Alarco, 2016; Obst, Onaran and 
Nikolaidi, 2017).  
 Despite the recent increasing emphasis on the empirical analysis of the relationship between 
wage share and economic growth, the empirical discussion on the factors that determine this 
relationship is very limited. Several theoretical papers (e.g., von Armin, Tavani and Carvalho, 2014; 
Palley, 2015, 2017; Kapeller and Schütz, 2015) discuss the factors that would determine the impact of 
the wage share on economic growth. Carvalho and Rezai (2016) empirically show that rising wage 
inequalities make the US economy more profit-led.  In addition, Stockhammer and Ederer (2008) for 
Austria and Stockhammer, Hein and Grafl (2011) for Germany discuss the impact of globalisation 
through showing their estimates on wage share’s impact on economic growth. This paper aims to fill in 
the gap in the literature by conducting a comprehensive empirical analysis on the structural factors 
behind the growth regime by using a wide cross-section of economies. 
 In our analysis, we first estimated the impact of wage share on GDP using Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) and Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) for 41 countries in which a 
long-run relationship between two variables exists. Next, we examined the impact of different 
characteristics on the probability of regime being wage-led or profit-led using probit analysis. Finally, 
we examined the factors that would affect the coefficient of the wage share’s coefficient in our first 
stage analysis using meta-regression.   
The paper specifically focuses on the impact of trade openness, wage inequality and private 
credit-to-GDP ratio in determining whether a regime is profit-led or wage-led. These are the three 
factors that rapidly evolved, particularly during the neoliberal era that emerged in the 1980s. The type 
of globalization that the world experienced led to a “race-to-the-bottom” in which wage competition 
between countries pushed simultaneous decline (Rodrik, 1997; Kiefer and Nada, 2016). Indeed, 
Onaran and Galanis (2014) note that globalization with wage policy coordination between countries 
could have improved growth and employment in all coordinating countries. However, as sufficient 
wage policy coordination has been lacking throughout the world, our results reflect that the countries 
that are more open to trade are more likely to be profit-led.  
 Starting from the 1980s, the wage inequality both in the OECD and non-OECD countries have 
also been rising (Galbraith, 2011). According to our estimates, this might also lead to a growth model 
in which it is harder for workers and capitalists to coordinate, our meta-regression analyses reveal that 
the countries with higher wage inequalities are more profit-led. Finally, a wide range of studies show 
that both developing and developed countries experienced a rise in financialisation during the 
neoliberal era, in which financial incomes compared to non-financial incomes, financial activities of 
non-financial firms and debt of non-financial sector and households significantly increased (Epstein 
and Jayadev, 2005; Demir, 2009; Jayadev, Mason and Schröder, 2018). We examined the impact of 
financialisation on determining the growth regime by using domestic credit to private sector as a 
percentage of GDP. Our results show that the countries with higher private credit-to-GDP ratios are 
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more likely to be profit-led. In an alternative meta-regression analysis with a more limited number of 
countries, we also show that the countries with greater household debt/GDP ratios are more profit-led. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present a theoretical 
model. In section 3, we present an empirical analysis. Finally, section four concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
In this section, after providing a background from the existing literature, we develop a full-fledged 
model and investigate which factors affect the wage-ledness of the economy. 
 
2.1 Wage-led or Profit-led? 
  
The earlier works of Rowthorn (1981) and Bowles and Boyer (1988) examine the impact of changing 
real wages on economic growth and show that higher real wages can either increase or reduce 
economic growth depending on the type of regime. Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) have a significant 
influence in forming the neo-Kaleckian approach on the relationship between wage shares and growth. 
According to the Bhaduri and Marglin model, capital accumulation is determined by profit share and 
the capacity utilisation rate. Assuming that the propensity to save is larger for capitalists than workers, 
a higher income share of workers would stimulate consumption, which might also raise capacity 
utilisation. Nevertheless, higher wage shares also have a negative direct impact on investments, since a 
squeeze in profit share might discourage capitalists from investing and also reduce capacity utilisation. 
If the direct negative effect of higher wage share on capacity utilisation is larger than the positive 
effect of wage share through consumption, a higher wage share would reduce capacity utilisation and 
total demand. In this case, the growth regime would be exhilarationist (profit-led).  However, if higher 
wage share’s positive effect through rising consumption is larger, the growth regime would be 
stagnationist (wage-led) in which the higher wage share would stimulate aggregate demand. 
 
The type of growth rate in each country is empirically examined using different methodologies. 
The first group of the studies tests the relationship between capacity utilisation and profit shares by 
considering a two-way relationship of both variables. In their SVAR analysis, Stockhammer and 
Onaran (2004) estimate that profit share does not Granger cause capacity utilisation in the US, the UK 
and France. On the other hand, using VAR, Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) and using TVAR, 
Carvalho and Rezai (2015) find that the US economy is profit-led. Moreover, Nikiforos and Foley 
(2012) show that the US economy has multiple equilibrium points- an equilibrium with higher wage 
share and capacity utilisation and an equilibrium with lower wage share and capacity utilisation. 
Nikiforos and Foley refuse the conventional understanding of wage-led growth. They conclude that the 
US economy is wage-led because a distributive or technological change that favours the wage share 
would lead the US economy to the equilibrium with higher capacity utilisation, although the initial 
impact of this change on capacity utilisation would be negative. 
 
The second group of studies estimates the impact of wage (or profit) shares on GDP by 
decomposing GDP into its components (consumption, investment, exports, and imports). These studies 
first estimate the impact of the wage share on each component and then predict the overall impact of 
the wage share on GDP using the estimated coefficients. In the earlier version of this approach, Bowles 
and Boyer (1995) test the impact of wages on each component of GDP for five developed economies. 
Later, a significant number of studies examine the effect of wage share on each component of GDP 
and predict the overall impact on GDP for various country cases. These studies mainly implement 
time-series analysis techniques. The results of these studies for the countries examined in this paper are 
listed in Appendix 1. Moreover, Stockhammer, Onaran and Ederer (2009) find that the Euro area as a 
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whole is wage-led, and Hartwig (2014) using panel data analysis estimates that OECD countries are on 
average wage-led. 
 
 
2.2 A simple model on wage-led/profit-led growth 
 
We use a simple model to demonstrate the relationship between profit share (𝜋) and total output (Y). 
Using this model, we also aim to discuss the structural conditions that would make a country more 
likely to be wage-led or profit-led. In accordance to the previous theoretical and empirical work, we 
define total output (Y) as a sum of consumption (C), investment (I), government expenditures (G), 
exports (X), and imports (M): 
 
 𝑌 = 𝐶 𝑊,𝑅 + 𝐼 𝑌,𝜋, 𝑏 + 𝑋 𝑌! ,𝜋, 𝑒 −𝑀(𝑌,𝜋, 𝑒) (1) 
 
where W is the total wage payments, R is the total profits, b is the business confidence, and YW is the 
world demand. e is the real exchange rate. An increase in e shows real depreciation. The government 
expenditures are omitted for simplicity. The workers earn wages and the capitalists earn profits. The 
total income (Y) is shared by workers and capitalist based on the profit share. Therefore, total wage 
payments (W) and total profits (R) are 
 
 𝑊 = 𝑌 1− 𝜋 ,       𝑅 = 𝑌𝜋 (2) 
 
Following this, the consumption function can be defined as  
 
 𝐶 = 𝑐! + 𝑐!𝑌 1− 𝜋 +  𝑐!𝑌𝜋 ,         𝑐! > 0, 𝑐! > 0, 𝑐! > 0 (3) 
 
where 𝑐! and 𝑐! are the marginal propensities to consume by workers and capitalists, respectively. In 
the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes (1936) notes that the marginal 
propensity to consume is larger for the poorer part of the population, which in our model is represented 
by the workers. Keynes’s argument is strongly consistent with the empirical findings on the impact of 
the profit share on consumption (e.g., Hein and Vogel, 2007; Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Onaran and 
Obst, 2016; Alarco, 2016; Obst, Onaran and Nikolaidi 2017)1. Following this, we assume that the 
propensity to consume is larger for workers (𝑐! > 𝑐! ). Hence, redistribution of incomes from 
capitalists to workers increases consumption. 
 
We define the investment function similar to Blecker’s (2002) and Naastepad’s (2006) 
investment functions: 
 
 𝐼 = 𝜙! 𝑌 !! 𝜋 !! 𝑏 !! (4) 
 𝜙!and 𝜙! are the elasticities of investment with respect to total output and profit share, respectively. 
Greater total demand would increase capacity utilisation and stimulate investments (𝜙! > 0).  Higher 
profit shares would have a direct positive effect on investments (𝜙! > 0), and the improving business 
confidence (b) would also raise investments  (𝜙! > 0).  
 
																																																								
1 For 6 OECD economies, Hein and Vogel (2007), for the EU-12 area and 15 separate countries, Onaran and Galanis 
(2014); for 16 Latin American economies, Alarco (2016) and for 15 EU countries, Obst, Onaran and Nikolaidi (2017) 
estimate the impact of wage share on consumption. They all find that higher wage share also increases consumption in all 
of the countries estimated. This supports the argument that the propensity to consume is larger for workers than capitalists. 
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 Next, we define the exports (𝑋) as a function of world demand (𝑌!), profit share (𝜋) and real 
exchange rate (𝑒): 
 
 𝑋 = 𝛼! 𝑌! !! 𝜋 !! 𝑒 !! (5)  
where 
 
 𝛼! > 0,     𝛼! > 0,   𝛼! > 0,    𝛼! > 0 (6) 
An increase in 𝑒 represents real depreciation of the currency. We assume  𝛼! > 0, since an 
increase in profit share reduces international competitiveness by increasing the unit cost of labour 
relative to the unit cost of labour in the trading partner (Naastepad, 2006; Hein and Tarassow, 2010; 
Onaran and Obst, 2016; Obst, Onaran and Nikolaidi 2017). We define the import function (𝑀) 
similarly except that the imports are dependent on domestic income (𝑌) rather than the world income 
(𝑌!)2:  
 𝑀 = 𝛾! 𝑌 !! 𝜋 !! 𝑒 !! (7) 
 
where 
 
 𝛾! > 0,    𝛾! > 0,   𝛾! < 0,    𝛾! < 0 (8) 
 
 
Following the  equations above, we find the impact of profit share on the percentage change in 
output (𝜃!) as 
 
 𝜃! = 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝜋𝑌 = − 𝑐! − 𝑐! + 𝜙! 𝐼𝑅 + 𝛼! 𝑋𝑅 − 𝛾!𝑀𝑅𝜓!  (9)  
where 
 
 𝜓! = 1− 𝑐! 1− 𝜋 − 𝑐!𝜋 − 𝜙! 𝐼𝑌 + 𝛾!𝑀𝑌  (10) 
 
We assume that the Keynesian stability condition holds (𝜓! > 0). The growth regime in an 
economy will be wage-led if the rising profit share’s negative impact through gap in marginal 
propensities to consume (𝑐! − 𝑐!) is larger than its positive effect through investment, exports and 
imports. The regime is profit-led in the reverse case.  
 
 
2.3. Factors affecting the wage-ledness/profit-ledness 
 
The growth regime in an economy is dependent on structural factors that are specific to each country. 
In this section, we will theoretically discuss the structural factors that determine whether the growth 
regime in an economy is profit-led or wage-led. We will focus on the influence of three factors: trade 
openness, wage inequality and credit availability. 																																																								
2 Unlike our work, Naastepad (2006) assumes that the imports are solely dependent on domestic output. Similarly, in Hein 
and Tarassow’s (2010) model, the negative impact on net exports comes only from capacity utilisation. Nevertheless, 
changes in profit share and real appreciation would also affect imports, since it changes the relative competitiveness of 
domestic goods also in the home market.  
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2.3.1 Trade openness 
 
The impact of international trade on the relationship between wage share and economic growth was 
examined starting from the earlier neo-Kaleckian work. Blecker (1989) and Bhaduri and Marglin 
(1990) show that greater wage shares reduce the international competitiveness of economies through 
increasing real production costs. Therefore, a growth regime becomes less likely to be wage-led when 
the net exports are considered. Using a neo-Kaleckian two country model, von Armin, Tavani and 
Carvalho (2014) show that an increase in wage share in the home country would decrease the home 
country’s global demand share and also lead to a decline in the home country’s aggregate demand 
unless the wage share in the foreign country also rises. In another neo-Kaleckian two-country model, 
Rezai (2015) shows that trade openness make the home economy more profit-led under the conditions 
that currency depreciation in the home country increases the output in the home country. 
The empirical studies following the neo-Kaleckian framework strongly support the argument 
that the net exports component of aggregate demand in the majority of the economies are profit-led 
(e.g., Naastepad and Storm, 2006; Onaran and Galanis, 2014, Onaran and Obst, 2016)3.  Similarly, 
using panel data analysis for a sample of 20 countries, Behringer and van Treeck (2013) estimate that a 
higher wage share affects the current account balance negatively. These results hint that trade openness 
would make a country more profit-led through expanding the share of profit-led components of 
aggregate demand. 
Several studies estimate the possible impact of trade openness on the link between the wage 
share and aggregate demand. For Austria, Stockhammer and Ederer (2008) and for Germany, 
Stockhammer, Hein and Grafl (2011) conclude that globalisation weakened the positive impact of the 
wage share on aggregate demand in Germany through expanding the influence of net exports on 
aggregate demand. Moreover, Onaran and Galanis (2014) showed that Australia, Canada, Mexico, 
Argentina, India, China, and South Africa have wage-led domestic demand and are profit-led 
economies when the net exports are also considered. 
In the more globalized world, the pressure of international competitiveness and wage share’s 
negative effect on net exports weakens the labour movements and leads to policies that would change 
the distribution in favour of the capital owners (Rodrik, 1997, Onaran, 2009, Oyvat, 2011). This leads 
to a race to the bottom in which wage shares are simultaneously reduced in a large number of 
countries. These countries cannot stimulate economic growth through lower wage shares, since net 
exports in every country by definition cannot simultaneously increase. 
Kiefer and Rada (2015) test the race to the bottom arguments and conclude that the wage 
shares in a panel of thirteen OECD countries are on average following a downward trend due to 
international competition between countries for high profits. Moreover, they find that both capacity 
utilisation rates and wage shares simultaneously fall in the thirteen OECD countries due to the race to 
the bottom. Similarly, Onaran and Galanis (2014) estimate the effect a simultaneous increase of wage 
shares in the Euro-area 12 and 12 other economies. They find all of the economies estimated would be 
more wage-led if these economies jointly expanded their wage shares through international 
coordination. They also conclude that the G-20 as a whole is wage-led. 
However, in a world in which the international coordination of wages is weak, greater trade 
openness would enlarge the contribution of GDP’s profit-led component and would increase the 																																																								3	To our knowledge, none of the empirical work examining the growth regime of net exports finds that the net exports 
component of GDP is wage-led. For all 15 countries and the EU-15 area estimated, Onaran and Galanis (2014) find that net 
exports are profit-led. Similarly, Onaran and Obst (2016) find that the net exports in 14 of 15 EU countries are profit-led 
and that the impact of net exports on aggregate demand in Luxembourg is insignificant. Similarly, Naastepad and Storm 
(2006) find that the impact of wage growth on export growth is negative in 6 OECD countries and is negligible in the 
Netherlands and the US.	
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likelihood of a country being profit-led. The influence of rising trade openness on the growth regime 
can also be shown in our model. If exports/output and imports/output ratios were higher due to 
exogenous reasons (e.g., greater concentration of production in specific sectors, trade agreements), 𝛼! 
and 𝛾! would be higher. For the given 𝑌 and 𝜋, an economy with higher 𝛼! and hence greater share of 
exports in GDP would be more likely to be profit-led. 
 
 
𝑑𝜃!𝑑𝛼! = 𝛼!𝑋𝛼!𝜓!𝑅 > 0 (11) 
 
The impact of 𝛾! and hence the greater share of imports in GDP are conditional on the profit-
ledness of an economy, as shown in equation (12). The sign of equation (12) depends on 𝛾!’s effect on 𝜃! through, 𝛾!’s direct effect on the sign of change in GDP-profit share relationship (!!! !!!!!) and its 
effect through changing the GDP multiplier (!!! !!!!!!!).   
 
 𝑑𝜃!𝑑𝛾! = −𝑀𝛾! 𝛾!𝑅 + 𝛾!𝜃!𝑌𝜓! 	 (12) 	
If the growth regime were wage-led (𝜃! < 0), a greater 𝛾! would push the economy towards a 
more profit-led regime (!!!!!! > 0). If the growth regime were weakly profit-led in the way that 𝛾!’s 
impact on the numerator of 𝜃! were stronger than its effect through multiplier  (!!! < !!!!! ), then a 
greater 𝛾! would still make the growth regime more profit-led. However, if 𝛾!’s effect through the 
multiplier were stronger, the greater 𝛾! would push the regime toward being less profit-led. Therefore, 
the ambiguity of  !!!!!!’s sign affects only the magnitude of profit-ledness; greater openness to imports 
(𝛾!) still increases the likelihood of being profit-led. In summary, the economies that are more open to 
trade are more likely to be profit-led. 	
 
 
2.3.2 Wage inequality 
The income distribution within workers is another factor that would influence the wage-ledness of an 
economy. The distribution between workers would affect the average propensity to consume of 
workers, since the workers with lower wages are expected to have higher propensity to consume 
following the Keynesian view that the propensity to consume is lower for a poorer population. The 
lower propensity to consume (and a higher savings rate) in higher income quartiles is demonstrated in 
Carvalho and Rezai (2016) for the US. Based on this, Carvalho and Rezai assume that an increase in 
wage inequality would increase the savings rate of workers and make the demand regime more profit-
led. Carvalho and Rezai also empirically support their argument, by demonstrating that the regime in 
the US is less profit-led when the wage inequality in the US is lower. Similarly, using three class 
analyses (capitalists/top management; managers/middle managers; workers), Palley (2015, 2017) 
shows that reducing the share of managers (or middle managers) in the wage bill would shift the 
economic regime from profit-led to wage-led4.  																																																								4	Palley uses different terminologies in his theoretical models in Palley (2015) and Palley (2017). In Palley (2015), he 
assumes that capitalists and top management class receive the profits and that the middle management class receives higher 
wages compared to the worker class. In Palley (2017), the three classes listed are rather named as capitalists, managers and 
workers. In this paper, the capitalists again receive a larger share of profits, and managers receive higher wages than do 
workers. 
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The impact of wage inequality on wage-ledness can be observed using a consumption equation 
that includes two types of agents receiving higher and lower wages. The agents receiving higher wages 
could be either managers and/or very-skilled workers, which we consider to constitute the smaller part 
of the population receiving wages. 
 𝐶 = 𝑐! + 𝑐!𝜎 + 𝑐! 1− 𝜎 𝑌 1− 𝜋 +  𝑐!𝑌𝜋 ,          (13) 
 
 𝑐! > 0, 𝑐! > 0, 𝑐! > 0, 𝑐! > 0 (14) 
where 𝑐! and 𝑐! are the propensity to consume values for those receiving higher and lower wages, 
respectively. 𝜎 is the share that workers with higher wages receive of total wage payments. Following 
this, we can show the impact of rising profit share on the percentage change in total output (𝜃!) as 
 𝜃! = 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝜋𝑌 = − 𝑐!𝜎 + 𝑐! 1− 𝜎 − 𝑐! + 𝜙! 𝐼𝑅 + 𝛼! 𝑋𝑅 − 𝛾!𝑀𝑅𝜓!  (15) 
where  
 𝜓! = 1− (𝑐!𝜎 + 𝑐! 1− 𝜎 ) 1− 𝜋 − 𝑐!𝜋 − 𝜙! 𝐼𝑌 + 𝛾!𝑀𝑌  (16) 
 We assume that the Keynesian stability condition holds and 𝜓! > 0. Overall, the effect of 
rising share of higher wages in profit-ledness is    
 
𝑑𝜃!𝑑𝜎 = (𝑐! − 𝑐!) 1− (1− 𝜋)𝜃!𝜓! 	 (17) 
which will be positive when 
 1 > (1− 𝜋)𝜃!	 (18) 
According to Alarco’s (2016), Hein and Vogel’s (2008), Obst, Onaran and Nikolaidi’s (2017) 
and Onaran and Galanis’s (2014) estimates, which are studies considering a group of countries, all of 
the countries examined satisfy the condition above5. Similarly, according to our estimates in Section 
3.1.1, the condition (18) is satisfied for all countries in our sample except Italy and Norway. 
In summary, the rising wage inequality would push a wage-led country (𝜃! < 0) towards being 
more profit-led. Higher wage inequality also increases the profit-ledness of a profit-led economy 
(𝜃! > 0) unless the negative impact of a higher wage share on total output is exceptionally high. The 
ambiguity that we highlight for the profit-led economies is similar to the outcome in Carvalho and 
Rezai (2016). 
 
 																																																								
5 According to Alarco (2016), Hein and Vogel (2008), Obst, Onaran and Nikolaidi (2017) and Onaran and Galanis’s (2014) 
estimates, a percentage point increase in profit share does not increase the total output by more than 1% in any of the 
countries except the China case estimated by Onaran and Galanis. Nevertheless, using Onaran and Galanis’s average wage 
share data for China, we can show that the condition 1 > (1 − 𝜋)𝜃! still holds for China. 	
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2.3.3 Household borrowing and debt 
The impact of household borrowing and debt was examined by several studies in line with Kaleckian-
Steindlian framework. Using a Steindlian model of consumer debt, Dutt (2006) shows that consumer 
borrowing simulates short-run growth through rising consumer demand, while in the long-run, its 
effect is ambiguous due to increasing consumer debt and redistribution of income in favour of higher 
income group. In their empirical analysis, Stockhammer and Wildauer (2015) show that the OECD 
economies were debt-driven prior to 2007 crisis. Similarly, Kim, Setterfield and Mei (2015) 
empirically find that household borrowing has a significant positive effect on consumption in the post-
1980 US.  
However, the impact of borrowing and debt on the wage-ledness of a country was first 
examined in Kapeller and Schütz (2015). Kapeller and Schütz highlight that if lower income workers 
sufficiently borrow consumer credits to keep up their consumption with higher income workers, the 
growth regime could shift from wage-led to “consumption-driven profit-led demand regime”. 
However, the rising debt would make the influence of consumer borrowing on the type of regime 
ambiguous, since the lower wage share can also increase indebtedness and withhold workers’ 
consumption due to interest payments and instalments. Vasudevan (2017) also reflects on the 
ambiguity of the finance sector’s influence on the type of growth regime. According to Vasudevan’s 
model, the finance-led regimes tend to be profit-led, whereas the finance-burdened regimes tend to be 
wage-led. 
 Setterfield and Kim (2016) and Setterfield, Kim and Rees (2016) show that the economies are 
in the short run more profit-led when workers’ savings and net borrowing are considered. This is 
because rising profit share would increase workers’ borrowing and rentier income and consequently 
rentiers’ consumption, which both would lead to a condition in which the higher profit share raises 
consumption. However, a debt-led growth regime might not be sustainable in the long run. Higher 
profit share could also lead to an economic crisis, if it pushed the household debt to an unsustainable 
level.  
We can show the impact of household borrowing and debt by modifying our simple model in 
section 2.1.1. For simplicity, we assume that the economy is closed (𝑋 = 0, 𝑀 = 0).  Following 
Kapeller and Schütz (2015), Setterfield and Kim (2016) and Setterfield, Kim and Rees (2016), we 
assume that the workers do not save and that they tend to borrow for “keeping up” with the 
consumption of higher income agents, which in our case are the capitalists. The capitalists save and 
lend to workers and receive an interest income on top of their profits. Therefore, the capitalists’ 
consumption (𝐶!) is a function of their profit and interest revenues, 
 𝐶! = 𝑐!(𝜋𝑌 + 𝑖𝐷) (19) 
where i is the rate of interest and D is the debt stock 
A consumption function similar to Kapeller and Schütz (2015) would reflect workers’ 
consumption6  
 𝐶!! = 𝛽 𝐶!/𝑁! 𝑁! + (1− 𝛽)𝐶! (20) 
where 𝑁! is the number of workers, 𝑁! is the number of capitalists, and 𝛽 is a term that reflects 
households’ desire and capability to borrow. 𝐶! is the consumption of workers when the workers do 
not borrow (𝛽 = 0) and still face the debt burden: 																																																								6	In Kapeller and Schütz (2015), lower income workers borrow to keep up with the consumption of higher income workers. 
Unlike their model, we have two agents, namely, capitalists and workers, in our simple model, and workers borrow to keep 
up with the consumption of capitalists.	
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 𝐶! = 𝑐!( 1− 𝜋 𝑌 − 𝑖𝐷) (21) 	 𝐶!/𝑁! is the average consumption of a capitalist, and an average worker consumes as much as 
a capitalist with the help of borrowing if 𝛽 = 1. 
Considering that 𝜆 is the ratio between the number of capitalists (𝑁!) and number of workers 
(𝑁!), 
 𝜆 = 𝑁!/𝑁! (22) 
This would make the consumption of workers 
 𝐶!! = 𝛽𝜆 𝑐!(𝜋𝑌 + 𝑖𝐷) + 1− 𝛽 𝐶! (23) 
Following this the total consumption function is 
 𝐶 = 𝑐! 1+ 𝛽𝜆 (𝜋𝑌 + 𝑖𝐷)+ 1− 𝛽 𝑐! 1− 𝜋 𝑌 − 𝑖𝐷  (24) 
From (1), (4) and (24), we can conclude that the short-run impact of the rising profit share on 
the percentage change on total output (𝜃!) is 
 𝜃! = 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝜋𝑌 = 𝑐! 1+ 𝛽𝜆 − 1− 𝛽 𝑐! + 𝜙! 𝐼𝑅𝜓!  (25) 
where 
 𝜓! = 1− 𝑐!𝜋 1+ 𝛽𝜆 − 1− 𝛽 𝑐! 1− 𝜋 − 𝜙! 𝐼𝑌 (26) 
 
Considering the Keynesian stability condition holds (𝜓! > 0), we can show the impact of 
changing borrowing behaviour of workers on short-run profit-ledness as 
 𝑑𝜃!𝑑𝛽 = 𝑐!𝜆 + 𝑐! − 𝜃! 𝑐! 1− 𝜋 − 𝑐!𝜋𝜆𝜓!  (27) 
A positive sign for !"!!"  is likely as 𝑐! > 𝑐!(1− 𝜋)𝜃! is likely to be observed based on the 
coefficients previously estimated for 𝜃!7. Hence, households’ higher consumer borrowing is expected 
to make a regime more profit-led, when the increases in overall indebtedness are not considered. This 
is because the workers still tend to consume at higher levels through borrowing, even when their share 
of income declines. 
 However, the household debt also increases in each period by the sum of the gap between 
workers’ consumption and workers’ net income after their interest payments: 																																																								7	According to Alarco (2016), Hein and Vogel (2008), Obst, Onaran and Nikolaidi (2017) and Onaran and Galanis’s (2014) 
estimates, a percentage point increase in profit share does not increase the total output by more than 1% in any of the 
countries except the China case estimated by Onaran and Galanis. Nevertheless, using Onaran and Galanis’s average wage 
share data for China, we can show that the condition 1 > (1 − 𝜋)𝜃! still holds for China. This condition similarly holds for 
all countries except Norway and Italy in our estimations in Section 3.1.1.	
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𝑑𝐷𝑑𝑡 = 𝐷 = 𝐶!! − 1− 𝜋 𝑌 − 𝑖𝐷 = 𝑐! 𝛽𝜆 𝜋𝑌 + 𝑖𝐷 − (1− 𝑐!) 1− 𝜋 𝑌 + 𝑖𝐷  (28) 
 Higher profit share would lead to faster accumulation of consumer debt with the given constant 
parameters: 
 𝑑𝐷𝑑𝜋 = 𝑐! 𝛽𝜆 + (1− 𝑐!) 𝑌 > 0 (29) 
 Moreover, workers’ higher capacity and willingness to borrow (𝛽 ) would increase the 
magnitude of profit share’s effect on the rise in debt: 
 
𝜕!𝐷𝜕𝜋𝜕𝛽 = 𝑐! 𝑌𝜆 > 0 (30) 
The effect of debt on output is ambiguous as in (31):  
 
𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐷 = 𝑐! 1+ 𝛽𝜆 𝑖 − 1− 𝛽 𝑐!𝑖	 (31) 
This shows that the higher level of borrowing might also increase the negative impact of the 
profit share on output, since at the higher level of borrowing, an increase in the profit share can also 
restrict the workers’ consumption through leading to high levels of debt. Hence, similar to Kapeller 
and Schütz (2015) and Setterfield, Kim and Rees (2016), we show that the impact of household 
borrowing on wage-ledness is ambiguous when household debt is considered.  
	
	
3. Empirical Analysis 
Based on the simple model that we have developed in the previous section, we construct three 
empirically testable hypotheses. Specifically, we will test whether  
1. a higher level of trade openness 
2. a higher level of wage inequality 
3. a higher level of private credit to GDP ratio 
make a growth regime more wage-led or profit-led. 
In this section, following the description of the empirical methodology and the dataset 
employed in the analysis, we present the estimation results.  
 
3.1 Methodology 
Our empirical methodology uses a two-step estimation approach: First, we conduct a time-series 
analysis for each country in our sample to establish the type of the growth regime of each country. 
Specifically, for each country, we aim to find out whether the growth regime is wage-led or profit-led. 
Then, in the second-step, using the findings from the first step, we run cross-country regressions to 
understand what factors account for classifying a country as being wage-led or profit-led. 
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3.1.1. Time-Series Analysis 
In the time-series analysis, for a particular country, we aim to establish a robust relationship between 
the wage-share (ratio of total wage bill to GDP) and the natural logarithm of aggregate real GDP. 
Unlike the previous work following the GDP decomposition approach (e.g., Onaran and Galanis, 
2014; Hein and Vogel, 2007) in which the relationship in each component of GDP is separately 
estimated, we estimated a single regression for each country. This is, because the meta-regression 
analyses require the use of a single coefficient and standard deviation for each country. Moreover, for 
providing greater consistency in our estimations, we aimed to only use coefficients from long-run 
equations of cointegrating vectors. This would be harder to satisfy when the GDP decomposition 
approach is followed. 
We suspect that government expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) and the real exchange rate 
might affect the relationship between wage share and GDP in some of the countries. Therefore, similar 
to Obst, Onaran and Nikolaidi (2017), we included government expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
and also the real exchange rate in the time-series regressions, whenever we find cointegrating vectors 
with these variables. Finally, we also have checked the presence of a trend using different trend 
specifications.  
More specifically, for each country, we use three different models. In the first and most general 
one (Model Type 1), we estimate the relationship between the wage share, natural logarithm of GDP, 
government spending share in GDP and the real exchange rate. For this, we first check the order of 
integration of all the four variables using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. If the order of 
integration of all the variables is 1 and the Johansen cointegration test at 5% significance level 
indicates the presence of integration between the variables, we estimate a vector error correction model 
(VECM), where the number of lags is determined according to the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). We estimated VECMs in the following form: 
 
 
∆ log(𝐺𝐷𝑃)! = 𝑎!(𝑏! log(𝐺𝐷𝑃)!!! − 𝑏!𝑤𝑠!!! − 𝑏!𝐺!!! − 𝑏!𝑅𝐸𝑅!!! − 𝜇! − 𝜌!𝑡)+ 𝑎! 𝑐!𝐺!!! − 𝑐!𝑤𝑠!!! − 𝑐! log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 !!! − 𝑐!𝑅𝐸𝑅!!! − 𝜇! − 𝜌!𝑡+ 𝑎! 𝑑!𝑅𝐸𝑅!!! − 𝑑!𝑤𝑠!!! − 𝑑! log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 !!! − 𝑑!𝐺!!! − 𝜇! − 𝜌!𝑡+ Γ!Δ log(𝐺𝐷𝑃)!!!!!!! + Λ!Δ𝐺!!!!!!! + Υ!Δ𝑅𝐸𝑅!!!!!!! + 𝑣 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀! (32) 
 
where 
 
 log(𝐺𝐷𝑃)! = 𝑏!𝑏! 𝑤𝑠! + 𝑏!𝑏! 𝐺! + 𝑏!𝑏! 𝑅𝐸𝑅! + 𝜇!𝑏! + 𝜌!𝑏! 𝑡 (33) 
 
is our long-run relationship for the logarithm of GDP (log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 ). ws is the wage share, G is the share 
of government expenditures in GDP, RER is the real exchange rate, and t is the time trend. a3 = 0 if the 
Johansen cointegration test suggests 2 cointegrating vectors, and a2, a3 = 0 if the Johansen 
cointegration test suggests only 1 cointegrating vector. For each country, we checked for the cases of 
VECMs with unrestricted trend, restricted trend, unrestricted constant and restricted constant in order 
and preferred the models in which cointegrating vectors exist.  
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If at least one of the variables has an order of integration other than 1 (such as 0 or 2) or the 
four variables are not cointegrated according to the results of the Johansen cointegration test, we 
checked cointegration using an autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) bounds approach. If the 
variables are cointegrated, we estimate an autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) model in the error 
correction form where the number of lags is again determined using the AIC. ARDL analysis also 
allows us check for the presence of a structural break using the Gregory-Hansen test with different 
trend or regime shifts. Hence, our ARDL models be expressed as 
 
 
∆ log(𝐺𝐷𝑃)! = 𝑎(𝑏! log(𝐺𝐷𝑃)!!! − 𝑏!𝑤𝑠!!! − 𝑏!𝐺!!! − 𝑏!𝑅𝐸𝑅!!! − 𝜇 − 𝜌𝑡)+ Γ!Δ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 !!!!!!!! + Λ!Δ𝐺!!!
!!
!!! + Υ!Δ𝑅𝐸𝑅!!!
!!
!!! + 𝑣 + 𝑟!𝑡 + 𝑟!𝑠+ 𝜀! (34) 
	
where s is the dummy variable on the years after the structural change and 
 
 log(𝐺𝐷𝑃)! = 𝑏!𝑏! 𝑤𝑠! + 𝑏!𝑏! 𝐺! + 𝑏!𝑏! 𝑅𝐸𝑅! + 𝜇𝑏! + 𝜌𝑏! 𝑡 (35) 
 
is our long-run relationship for the logarithm of GDP (log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 ). 
If using both procedures does not yield significant estimates in the first model, then we use the 
second model (Model Type 2) without the presence of the real exchange rate and again repeat the same 
procedure with the VECM and ARDL approaches. Finally, if the second model yields non-significant 
estimates, we use a third model (Model Type 3) with only wage share and the natural logarithm of real 
GDP. The countries in which a long-run relationship, a cointegration between wage share and 
logarithm of real GDP or a significant effect of wage share are not detected are eliminated from our 
sample. 
 
3.1.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Once the time-series analysis indicates the presence of wage or profit-led growth, we next create a 
cross-sectional dummy variable, which for a given country takes the value of 1 if the growth regime is 
wage-led and 0 if the regime is profit-led. That is, 
 Pr(𝑌 = 1|𝑋) = 𝜑(𝑋!𝛽) (34) 
 
Here, Pr denotes the probability, 𝜑 is the cumulative distribution function, and X represents the 
control variables of the regression. Then, a maximum likelihood estimation is performed where the 
estimated coefficients indicate the effects of changes in the independent variables on the relative place 
of standard normal distribution; therefore, they cannot be interpreted as marginal effects. 
Considering the binary nature of our dependent variable constructed as explained above in the 
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cross-sectional analysis, we then run a probit regression where we regress this dummy variable on a 
number of independent variables. We controlled the structural characteristics of each country by the 
average values of our independent variables through the period in which the time-series analysis was 
conducted. The impact of trade openness is controlled by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to 
GDP. We use the University of Texas Inequality Project’s (2018) industrial pay inequality data, UTIP-
UNIDO, for testing the influence of wage inequality on a country’s wage-ledness. UTIP-UNIDO data 
measure industrial pay inequality by the Theil index.  
The datasets on household debt or credit are insufficient for covering the period in our time-
series analysis (1961-2011) for 41 developed and developing economies. Therefore, we instead 
preferred domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP, which would measure the level of 
financialisation in an economy8. We compared the average domestic credit to private sector as a 
percentage of GDP values with post-1989 average household debt as a percentage of GDP from BIS 
(2018) for 25 countries with data available. Although the periods covered by the two variables are 
different, the two variables are strongly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.803. 
The impacts of GDP per-capita, population growth rate, government spending as a percentage 
of GDP, average years of schooling and time trend are our other independent variables. We also 
controlled for the structure of our models by a dummy variable on the use of the ARDL model, 
dummy variables for the type of model used for each country (Model Types 1, 2 or 3) and a dummy 
variable on whether our wage share data are industrial labour share coming from UNIDO’s (2014) 
INDSTAT2, Industrial Statistics Database or adjusted wage share for the entire economy coming from 
AMECO and Onaran and Galanis (2014). The probit regression will allow us to estimate the nature of 
the effects of several factors on the probability of an economy being wage-led. 
Moreover, we also run a random-effects meta-regression where for each country, the estimated 
coefficient of wage share in the time-series analysis as well as its standard deviation is used in the 
analysis. The meta-regression analysis uses the estimated coefficient of the wage share in the time-
series analysis as well as its standard deviation. We use the method of moments estimator in the 
random-effects setting, as we also allow for the existence of between-country variation.  
 
3.2 Data 
Table 1 presents the descriptive summary statistics of the entire dataset. In total, we have data for 41 
developing and developed countries. Although the largest span is from 1961 to 2011, the time-series 
dimension of each country is different due to the limited availability of the wage share series. Our 
source of the data for GDP and GDP per-capita is Penn World Tables 8.1. Government spending as a 
share of GDP (%), real effective exchange rate index (2010=100), population growth (%), and trade as 
a share of GDP (%) are obtained from the World Development Indicators (2018). The real effective 
exchange rate index is defined as the nominal effective exchange rate against a weighted average of 
several foreign currencies over a price deflator or index of costs. Average years of schooling is 
obtained from Barro and Lee (2013)9, whereas wage inequality series is acquired from UTIP’s (2017) 
industrial pay inequality dataset based on UNIDO Industrial Statistics. For the wage share series, we 
used AMECO’s adjusted wage share and UNIDO’s (2014) INDSTAT2 databases. The AMECO 
database represents adjusted wage share for the entire economy, whereas the UNIDO database is only 																																																								8	Among the alternative datasets, OECD’s (2018) household debt percentage of net disposable income dataset starts from 
1995 and mainly covers OECD countries only. Similarly, Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010)’s dataset on household credit 
to GDP is for 1990-2016. BIS’s (2018) “total debt of households as a % percentage of GDP” data covers the pre-1980s for 
only 11 countries and covers the pre-1990s for only 16 countries in our dataset. Although BIS’s data is restricted, we use 
the averages in this data for robustness analysis. 9	Barro and Lee’s (2013) dataset exhibits average years of schooling for each 5 years. The gaps between 5 years are filled 
with linear interpolation.	
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for the manufacturing industry. For the adjusted wage share of some specific economies, we also 
utilize Onaran and Galanis (2014)10 and OECD (2017) (Appendix 1).   
 
Table 1. Descriptive Summary Statistics 
  Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Wage Share (%) 47.01 18.01 3.33 87.68 
GDP  (thousand USD) 582.3 147.5 1.1 13379.3 
Government Expenditures 
(% GDP) 18.2 8.9 6.1 79.8 
Real Exchange Rate 
(national currency/USD) 139.56 769.58 0.00 10616.30 
Average Years of Schooling 7.49 2.60 1.09 13.18 
Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector (% GDP) 58.65 47.43 4.18 221.29 
GDP per capita (USD) 14944 11922 700 72528 
Household Debt (% GDP) 51.53 28.47 0.10 139.40 
Income Inequality (Gini) 35.34 10.01 17.76 71.18 
Population Growth (%)  1.40 1.03 -0.38 5.74 
Trade to GDP (%) 77.21 70.83 7.53 447.06 
Wage Inequality (Theil) 0.0312 0.0270 0.0009 0.2720 
 
3.3. Estimation Results 
The results of our Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) and Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) model estimations are reported in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively, for each country. Here, 
for each country, we report which model type we use (Model Types 1, 2 or 3 as explained in the first 
subsection), the trend type if included, and the estimated coefficient of real GDP in the time-series 
regression as well as its standard deviation. Note that a positive (negative) estimated coefficient here 
implies a wage-led (profit-led) growth. We observe from Table 2 and Table 3 that of 41 countries, 21 
of them have wage-led growth, whereas the remaining 20 are of a profit-led growth regime. A 
comparison of our results with the existing literature is provided in Appendix 1. 
Figure 1 provides information on the structural characteristics of wage-led and profit-led 
countries that we estimated. The box-plot diagrams reflect the average trade/GDP (%), industrial pay 
inequality (Theil), and domestic credit to private sector/GDP (%) for each country for the periods of 
our estimations. Figure 1 reflects that the countries with higher values of average trade/GDP (%) are 
mainly profit-led. The third quartile for average trade/GDP is 92.8% for profit-led economies, which is 
larger than 72.6%, the third quartile for wage-led economies. Moreover, the profit-led countries 
include countries with higher outlier values of trade openness (Singapore, Luxembourg, and Malta).  
Figure 1 also shows that the profit-led economies on average are countries that have larger 
industrial pay inequalities. The median, first quartile and third quartile values of industrial pay 
inequalities are higher in the group of profit-led economies. An exceptional case for the wage-led 																																																								10	If the wage share data had a one or two year gap, we filled the gap with linear interpolation. In the case of gaps longer 
than two years, we preferred the part of the dataset that provides us longer data. In addition, we observed unrealistic breaks 
in the wage share data from UNIDO’s (2014) INDSTAT2. We treated the wage share data that changed more than 5 
percentage points between two observations as a change in methodology, unless an economic crisis, war or catastrophe was 
observed in the period of change. We preferred the longer part and dropped the rest of the dataset under these conditions. 
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countries is Jordan, which has a Theil value of 0.093 for wage inequality. Finally, Figure 1 mainly 
reflects higher values of average domestic credit to private sector /GDP (%) for wage-led economies. 
 
 
Table 2. Estimated Results in Vector Error Correction Models (VECM) – Dependent variable – 
Log(GDP) 
Country Model Type Trend 
LR 
coefficient 
for wage 
share 
LR std. 
dev. for 
wage share 
Estimation 
Period 
Argentina 3 Restricted Constant 0.066* 0.011 1972-2007 
Austria 1 Unrestricted Trend 0.143* 0.037 1965-2011 
Belgium 2 Unrestricted Trend 0.020* 0.008 1961-2011 
Canada 1 Restricted Trend -0.071* 0.023 1961-2011 
Chile 1 Unrestricted Trend -0.025* 0.010 1967-1994 
China-Macao 1 Unrestricted Trend 0.146* 0.030 1980-2011 
Ecuador 1 Unrestricted Trend 0.018* 0.003 1964-2008 
Egypt 1 Unrestricted Trend -0.012* 0.002 1966-1998 
Greece 2 Unrestricted Trend -0.060* 0.016 1962-2011 
Hong Kong 2 Unrestricted Constant 0.209* 0.065 1975-2011 
Iceland 1 Unrestricted Trend 0.077* 0.012 1972-1996 
India 1 Unrestricted Trend -0.092* 0.015 1964-2011 
Indonesia 1 Unrestricted Trend -0.122* 0.023 1971-2011 
Iran 1 Unrestricted Trend 0.223* 0.066 1981-2011 
Ireland 3 Unrestricted Trend -0.049* 0.010 1962-2011 
Italy 1 Unrestricted Trend 296.101* 50.656 1962-2011 
Jordan 1 Restricted Constant 0.056* 0.019 1975-2011 
Kenya 1 Unrestricted Trend -0.086* 0.015 1964-2011 
Luxembourg 2 Unrestricted Trend -0.162* 0.032 1961-2011 
Malta 1 Unrestricted Trend -0.019* 0.004 1965-2008 
Mexico 1 Restricted Constant -0.077* 0.016 1972-2009 
Netherlands 1 Unrestricted Trend 0.036* 0.004 1962-2011 
Norway 1 Unrestricted Trend 2.724* 0.515 1962-2011 
Pakistan 1 Unrestricted Trend -0.008** 0.004 1965-1991 
South Africa 2 Unrestricted Trend 0.138* 0.024 1972-2007 
South Korea 2 Restricted Trend 0.695* 0.140 1964-2011 
Spain 2 Unrestricted Trend 0.011* 0.003 1965-2011 
Sweden 1 Unrestricted Trend 0.052* 0.008 1962-2011 
Syria 2 Unrestricted Trend 0.032* 0.012 1967-1995 
Turkey 1 Unrestricted Constant 0.066** 0.030 1964-2009 
UK 1 Unrestricted Trend 0.051* 0.009 1962-2011 
US 2 Unrestricted Trend 0.072* 0.016 1962-2011 
Venezuela 1 Unrestricted Constant -0.042*** 0.022 1964-1998 
Notes: *, **, *** denote 1, 5 and 10% significance levels. Model 1 includes wage share, share of government 
expenditures in GDP (%) and real exchange rate, Model 2 includes wage share, share of government 
expenditures in GDP (%) and Model 3 includes wage share only. Trend column reflects different uses of trend 
in different models. When unrestricted trend is preferred, there are no restrictions on the trend parameters. In 
models with unrestricted constants, 𝜌! = 0 and 𝑟 = 0; in models with unrestricted constants 𝜌! = 0, 𝑟 = 0 and, 𝜇! = 0 and in models with unrestricted constants 𝜌! = 0, 𝑟 = 0, 𝜇! = 0 and 𝜈 = 0 in equations (32) and (33). 
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Table 3. Estimated Results in Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Models – Dependent 
variable – Log(GDP) 
Country Model Type Trend 
Structural 
change 
dummy  
LR 
coefficient 
for wage 
share 
LR std. 
dev. for 
wage 
share 
Estimation 
Period 
Australia 1 Yes Yes -0.005** 0.002 1967-1991 
Colombia 3 Yes N/A -0.056** 0.027 1967-2011 
Denmark 2 N/A N/A -0.097** 0.039 1964-2011 
Finland 1 Yes Yes -0.019* 0.006 1967-2011 
Japan 2 N/A N/A 0.084*** 0.047 1967-2010 
Malaysia 1 Yes N/A -0.061** 0.026 1972-2011 
Singapore 3 Yes Yes -0.040** 0.016 1967-2011 
Uruguay 3 N/A N/A -0.034* 0.005 1967-2008 
 Notes: *, **, *** denote 1, 5 and 10% significance levels. 
 
 
Figure 1. Average Trade/GDP (%), Wage Inequality (Theil) and Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector/GDP (%) for Profit-led and Wage-led Countries for the Years of Estimation  
 
 
 
The cross-sectional estimation results for the factors that would make an economy profit-led or 
wage-led are reported in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 4 reports the results of the probit regression using 
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the wage-led dummy as the dependent variable. According to the results of our probit regression, the 
countries where the levels of trade openness are higher are more likely to be profit-led, which is 
consistent with our section 2.3.1. Table 4 also shows that the countries with higher domestic private 
credit ratios tend to be profit-led. Moreover, countries with higher GDP per-capita and government 
spending to GDP ratios are more likely to be wage-led. Finally, we fail to find a significant effect of 
industrial pay inequality in our probit regression. 
 
 
Table 4. Cross-Sectional Probit Regression Results  (Profit-led = 0, Wage-led = 1) 
 Coefficient Marginal effects  
Log (Trade openness) -1.966* -0.781* 
 (0.686) (0.271) 
Wage inequality 49.811 19.794 
 (45.027) (17.841) 
Log (Credit-to-GDP) - 1.101*** -0.438*** 
 (0.630) (0.248) 
Log (GDP per-capita) 4.291** 1.705** 
 (1.861) (0.736) 
Population Growth 0.323 0.128 
 (0.607) (0.241) 
Government Sp. (% GDP) 0.042* 0.167* 
 (0.163) (0.065) 
Average years of schooling 0.414 0.164 
 (0.392) (0.155) 
Time 0.731* 0.291* 
 (0.229) (0.091) 
Observations 41 
Pseudo R-square 0.65 
Wald Test 36.76 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 1, 5 and 10% significance levels. 
Dummy variables for the type of models (Model 1, 2 or 3), a dummy variable for estimates with ARDL models, a 
dummy variable on the use of adjusted wage share in the estimates (as opposed to industrial wage share from UNIDO 
(2014)) are also controlled. 
 
 
Next, our meta-regression analyses in Table 5 reveal that the level of the estimated coefficient 
in the time-series analysis also depends on several variables. Consistent with Table 4, our baseline 
regression (1), which includes all 41 countries in our analysis, reflects that countries with greater trade 
openness are significantly more profit-led at the 5% significance level. Moreover, the countries with 
greater wage inequality are also more profit-led. However, our baseline regression (1) fails to reflect a 
significant impact of domestic credit to private sector/GDP (%) on wage-ledness at the 10% 
significance level. This might be due to the ambiguities discussed in section 2.3.3.  
To test the robustness of our analysis, we performed four extra meta-regression analyses. The 
long-run coefficients of wage share for Italy and Norway in Table 2 are over 1.00, which is 
significantly higher than for other countries. This might lead to a bias in our meta-regression analysis. 
Therefore, in regression (2), we excluded Italy and Norway from our analysis. However, the 
magnitudes and significance of trade/GDP (%), wage inequality and credit/GDP’s (%) coefficients are 
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very similar to the coefficients in regression (1). In regression (3) in Table 5, we included only 
countries with coefficients coming from Model 1 in which all wage shares, government 
expenditures/GDP (%) and real exchange rates are controlled. However, our meta-regression includes 
only 25 countries, and the coefficients for trade/GDP (%) and wage inequality are still significant at 
5%, with both being more negative.  
 
 
Table 5. Meta-Regression Estimation Results – Dependent variable: Long-run coefficient for wage 
share 
 
All 
countries 
Norway and 
Italy 
excluded 
Estimates 
from 
Model 1 
only 
With 
income 
inequality 
With 
household 
debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log (Trade openness) -0.034** -0.033** -0.090** -0.036** -0.035 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.039) (0.016) (0.038) 
Wage inequality -1.369** -1.333** -2.315**  -5.701** 
 (0.661) (0.624) (0.897)  (2.891) 
Log (Credit-to-GDP) -0.008 -0.008 0.059 -0.001  
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.039) (0.022)  
Log (GDP per-capita) 0.044 0.043 0.060*** 0.058** -0.048 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.028) (0.086) 
Population Growth 0.032** 0.032** 0.051** 0.026*** 0.056 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015) (0.052) 
Government Sp. (% GDP) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.009 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) 
Average years of schooling 0.017** 0.017** 0.017 0.016*** 0.067* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.023) 
Time 0.009* 0.009* 0.011* 0.006** 0.013 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
Income inequality, personal    -0.000  
    (0.001)  
Log (Household debt-to-GDP)     -0.093** 
     (0.046) 
Observations 41 39 25 39 25 
I-sq 94.01% 93.61% 92.55% 93.65% 94.02% 
Chi-sq Test 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.006 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses *, **, *** denote 1, 5 and 10% significance levels. Dummy 
variables for the type of models (Model 1,2 or 3), a dummy variable for estimates with ARDL models, and a dummy 
variable on the use of adjusted wage share in the estimates (as opposed to industrial wage share from UNIDO (2014)) 
are also controlled. 
 
 
In regression (4) in Table 5, we used personal income inequality as a proxy for wage inequality 
following Carvalho and Rezai (2016). For measuring income inequality, we used average standardized 
market income Gini coefficient measures from Solt (2018). However, the coefficient for the income 
Gini is close to zero and insignificant at 10%. This might be because the personal income inequality 
might not be a good proxy for wage inequality in emerging economies with widespread self-
employment and subsistence sector. Finally, in regression (5), we controlled for the impact of 
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household debt/GDP. We checked the impact of this measure for greater consistency with the model in 
section 2.3.3 that specifically focuses on the impact of household credit and debt. We used BIS’s 
(2018) household debt/GDP (%); however, these data are very limited for pre-1990 and include post-
1989 data for only 25 of the countries in our sample. Therefore, household debt/GDP (%) measures are 
averages from post-1989. Consistent with Table 4, our regression (5) shows that higher household debt 
significantly decreases the wage-ledness of an economy at the 5% significance level. Moreover, higher 
wage inequality’s impact on wage-ledness is also significantly negative. The trade openness’s impact 
on wage-ledness becomes insignificant at the 10% level in regression (5). However, trade openness’ 
coefficient size is similar to our baseline regression and might be insignificant due to a very small 
number of observations. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the structural factors that would make an economy profit-led or wage-led. Our 
results show that the economies with greater trade openness are more likely to be profit-led. Moreover, 
we demonstrate that higher wage inequality makes an economy more wage-led. We also find that the 
countries with private higher credit-to-GDP ratios are more likely to be profit-led and that the 
countries with higher household debt/GDP are more profit-led. 
If the policymakers aim to reach an egalitarian growth path, they should reconsider altering the 
structural factors that would determine the relationship between inequality and growth. Globalization 
with greater wage policy coordination between countries along with lower wage inequality would 
create a setting in which a simultaneous rise in wage shares along with higher growth rates would be 
more possible. Moreover, taming financialisation should also be considered by the policymakers for 
achieving labour-friendly economic growth. 				
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Appendix 1 
Table A1. Comparison of our Estimates with the Previous Work 
Our Estimations Previous work 
Country Growth Regime 
Estimation 
Period Data Source 
Growth 
Regime Source 
Argentina Wage-led 1972-2007  
Onaran and 
Galanis 
(2014) Profit-led 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) 
        Wage-led Alarco (2016) 
Australia Profit-led 1967-1991 UNIDO Profit-led 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) 
Austria Wage-led 1965-2011 UNIDO Profit-led 
Hein and 
Vogel (2007) 
  
  
  Profit-led 
Stockhammer 
and Ederer 
(2008) 
  
  
  Profit-led 
Onaran and 
Obst (2016) 
        Wage-led 
Obst, Onaran 
and Nikolaidi 
(2017) 
Belgium Wage-led 1961-2011 AMECO Profit-led 
Onaran and 
Obst (2016) 
        Profit-led 
Obst, Onaran 
and Nikolaidi 
(2017) 
Canada Profit-led 1961-2011 AMECO Profit-led 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) 
Chile Profit-led 1967-1994 UNIDO Profit-led Alarco (2016) 
China-Macao Wage-led 1980-2011 UNIDO     
Colombia Profit-led 1967-2011 UNIDO Wage-led 
Charpe ,Lee, 
Arias and 
Bridji (2014) 
  
   
Wage-led Alarco (2016) 
        Wage-led 
Loaiza, Tobon 
and Hincapie 
(2017) 
Denmark Profit-led 1964-2011 AMECO Profit-led 
Onaran and 
Obst (2016) 
  
  
  Wage-led 
Obst, Onaran 
and Nikolaidi 
(2017) 
Ecuador Wage-led 1964-2008 UNIDO Wage-led Alarco (2016) 
Egypt Profit-led 1966-1998 UNIDO     
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Our Estimations Previous work 
Country Growth Regime 
Estimation 
Period Data Source 
Growth 
Regime Source 
Finland Profit-led 1967-2011 UNIDO Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Obst (2016) 
        Wage-led 
Obst, Onaran 
and Nikolaidi 
(2017) 
Greece Profit-led 1962-2011 AMECO Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Obst (2016) 
        Wage-led 
Obst, Onaran 
and Nikolaidi 
(2017) 
Hong Kong Wage-led 1975-2011 UNIDO     
Iceland Wage-led 1972-1996 UNIDO     
India Profit-led 1964-2011 UNIDO Profit-led 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) 
Indonesia Profit-led 1971-2011 UNIDO     
Iran Wage-led 1981-2011 UNIDO     
Ireland Profit-led  1962-2011 AMECO Profit-led 
Kinsella 
(2013) 
Italy Wage-led 1962-2011 AMECO Wage-led 
Naastepad and 
Storm (2006) 
  
  
  Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) 
  
  
  Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Obst (2016) 
        Wage-led 
Obst, Onaran 
and Nikolaidi 
(2017) 
Japan Wage-led 1967-2010 UNIDO Profit-led 
Bowles and 
Boyer (1995) 
  
  
  Profit-led 
Naastepad and 
Storm (2006) 
        Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) 
Jordan Wage-led 1975-2011 UNIDO     
Kenya Profit-led 1964-2011 UNIDO     
Luxembourg Profit-led 1961-2011 AMECO Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Obst (2016) 
        Wage-led 
Obst, Onaran 
and Nikolaidi 
(2017) 
Malaysia Profit-led 1972-2011 UNIDO     
Malta Profit-led 1965-2008 UNIDO     
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Our Estimations Previous work 
Country Growth Regime 
Estimation 
Period Data Source 
Growth 
Regime Source 
Mexico Profit-led 1972-2009  OECD Profit-led 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) 
  
  
  Profit-led 
Charpe ,Lee, 
Arias and 
Bridji (2014) 
        Wage-led Alarco (2016) 
Netherlands Wage-led 1962-2011 AMECO Wage-led 
Naastepad 
(2006) 
  
  
  Wage-led 
Naastepad and 
Storm (2006) 
  
  
  Profit-led 
Hein and 
Vogel (2007) 
  
  
  Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Obst (2016) 
        Wage-led 
Obst, Onaran 
and Nikolaidi 
(2017) 
Norway Wage-led 1962-2011 AMECO     
Pakistan Profit-led 1965-1991 UNIDO     
Singapore Profit-led 1967-2011 UNIDO     
South Africa Wage-led 1972-2007 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) Profit-led 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) 
        Wage-led 
Strauss and 
Isaacs (2016) 
South Korea Wage-led 1964-2011 UNIDO Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Stockhammer 
(2005) 
        Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) 
Spain Wage-led 1965-2011 UNIDO Wage-led 
Naastepad and 
Storm (2006) 
  
  
  Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Obst (2016) 
        Wage-led 
Obst, Onaran 
and Nikolaidi 
(2017) 
Sweden Wage-led 1962-2011 AMECO Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Obst (2016) 
Syria Wage-led 1967-1995 UNIDO     
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Our Estimations Previous work 
Country Growth Regime 
Estimation 
Period Data Source 
Growth 
Regime Source 
Turkey Wage-led 1964-2009 UNIDO Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Stockhammer 
(2005) 
  
  
  Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) 
        Profit-led Yılmaz (2015) 
UK Wage-led 1962-2011 AMECO Wage-led 
Bowles and 
Boyer (1995) 
  
  
  Wage-led 
Naastepad and 
Storm (2006) 
  
  
  Wage-led 
Hein and 
Vogel (2007) 
  
  
  Wage-led 
Onaran and 
Obst (2016) 
        Wage-led 
Obst, Onaran 
and Nikolaidi 
(2017) 
US Wage-led 1962-2011 AMECO Wage-led 
Bowles and 
Boyer (1995) 
  
   
Profit-led 
Barbosa-Filho 
and Taylor 
(2006) 
  
   
Profit-led 
Naastepad and 
Storm (2006) 
  
   
Wage-led 
Hein and 
Vogel (2007) 
  
   
Wage-led 
Nikiforos and 
Foley (2012) 
  
   
Wage-led 
Onaran, 
Stockhammer 
and 
Grafl (2011) 
        Profit-led 
Carvalho and 
Rezai (2016) 
Uruguay Profit-led 1967-2008 UNIDO Wage-led Alarco (2016) 
Venezuela Profit-led 1964-1998 UNIDO Profit-led 
Charpe ,Lee, 
Arias and 
Bridji (2014) 
        Wage-led Alarco (2016) 
 
 
 
